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INTRODUCTION
Piece rate 1 compensation schemes provide economists with a natural link between observed wages and worker productivity. Exploiting this link to recover productivity from piece rate wages can provide direct evidence on worker productivity within the rm. 2 Yet piece rate compensation schemes also have incentive e ects on workers. The principal agent literature emphasizes the use of such compensation systems to solve shirking problems in the presence of asymmetric information. 3 These incentive e ects can have important implications for productivity studies using piece rate data. In particular, observed wages are functions of variables in uenced by both the worker his or her e ort, and the rm the parameters of the compensation system. Identifying the productivity o f w orkers requires separating out these two e ects. The fact that worker e ort is unobservable not only complicates the identi cation of the productivity pro le, but may also bias the results. That is, wage regressions that ignore worker e ort will be subject to an omitted variable bias if e ort is correlated with the regression's explanatory variables.
In this paper I estimate worker productivity pro les from piece rate data using methods which control for incentive e ects. To take account of incentive e ects I explicitly model the principal agent relationship between the rm and its workers. Modelling the incentive system which generated the observed wages allows for the derivation of optimal decision 1 I use the term piece-rate to refer to a payment s c heme under which w orkers are paid according to their output. 2 Gunderson 1975 used piece rate data to control for productivity di erences across workers in his study of male female wage di erentials. Similarly, W eiss 1992 used piece rate data to estimate the learning curve for manufacturing workers.
3 See Hart and Holmstrom 1985 for a review of this literature. 1 rules for worker e ort as a function of observable worker characteristics. These optimizing restrictions can then be used to control for worker e ort and to identify productivity pro les.
I apply this approach to piece rate data collected from the Britannia Mining Company. During the 1920s workers at Britannia were paid according to a productivity based bonus system. Workers worked in teams and received a guaranteed base wage supplemented with a bonus in proportion to team output exceeding a company set production standard.
The model developed in this paper incorporates the important aspects of the production process at the Britannia mine: asymmetric information, team production, and heterogeneous workers. Output is a function of worker e ort and a random shock that is observed by team members but not the rm before choosing an e ort level. E ort is in turn a function of worker characteristics tenure and age. Solving the model for equilibrium worker e ort implies a censored wage distribution, the parameters of which can be estimated using well-known censored regression techniques. These parameters can then be used to identify productivity pro les. Semi-parametric estimation allows for the relaxation of distributional assumptions of the parametric model.
The estimated productivity pro les provide unique evidence on the relationship between productivity and tenure. This relationship has been the focus of a large empirical literature in economics. Becker 1975 suggested that workers and rms would utilize a sharing contract in which wages were positively sloped in tenure, in order to protect investments in rm speci c human capital which increase worker productivity. A related literature of learning-by-doing models considers the e ect of productivity growth on observed wages in the absence of formal training. Estimates of rising wage pro les in tenure have traditionally been interpreted as supportive of these models. However, in most data sets, the link between wages and productivity is unknown. In fact, several well-known papers have derived positively sloped wage pro les in the absence of any productivity growth. 4 This casts doubt on the general ability o f w age pro les to identify productivity pro les. An advantage of using the Britannia data set is the limited applicability of these alternative models. Base-wages and bonus rates were not directly linked to worker tenure so that observed changes in wages for individual workers re ect changes in productivity.
In general, rms can use piece rate compensation schemes to attain goals other than motivate workers. In particular, such s c hemes can be used to sort workers, both across and within rms. 5 Taking account o f the aims of the rm is important to the interpretation and accuracy of empirical results. Firm records, which provide insight i n to these goals, suggest that the primary reason for introducing the compensation system at Britannia was to motivate workers. Yet, it is still important to take account of possible sorting e ects in empirical work as they may bias estimates of the productivity pro le. To accomplish this the model is extended to account for unobserved heterogeneity among workers within the mine.
The empirical results suggest that productivity pro les were increasing concave functions of tenure. The shape of the pro le is robust to departures from normal heteroscedastic errors and to the presence unobserved heterogeneity among workers. However, the slope of the pro le is upwardly biased when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. Results suggest that a one month increase in miner tenure from the sample average of 40 months increased productivity per shift by approximately 2.0e-3 pounds of copper. Furthermore, e ort is positively correlated with worker tenure. As workers gain more experience in the mine the cost of e ort decreases. This suggests that ignoring the e ort decision of the worker will lead to an upwardly biased estimate of the tenure e ect on productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief history of the bonus system at Britannia is given is Section 1. Section 2 presents and solves the model of the bonus system. Section 3 derives the wage distribution implied by the model and discusses estimation issues. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 gives the results.
THE BONUS SYSTEM
During the 1920s the Britannia Mining Company i n troduced a productivity based bonus system into its mining operations at Britannia Beach, British Columbia. Workers, who worked in teams, received a guaranteed base wage supplemented with a bonus in proportion to team productivity exceeding a company set standard.
There were several mines in operation at Britannia during the 1920s. This study concentrates on the Victoria mine which employed approximately one quarter of the mines total workforce which a v eraged 871 men in 1927. Within the Victoria mine several areas were worked simultaneously, with small groups of workers at each site. Bonuses were paid twice per month. Where the quality o f r o c k w as not important, as in the building of access tunnels, productivity w as measured in terms of feet of advance. On the other hand, in ore removal operations, productivity w as measured in terms of tons of ore removed. This prevented workers from loading up ore carts with waste rock.
Productivity and bonuses were calculated on a per-shift basis. In particular, a production standard was set for each area of the mine in terms of output per shift. At the end of each p a y period, total output at each site was divided by the number of shifts worked at the site. If this measure of productivity per shift exceeded the production standard, then bonuses were paid to all workers who had worked shifts in that area of the mine. Each of these workers would receive an amount in proportion to the number of shifts they had worked in that area. Workers could receive bonuses from more than one area of the mine.
A b o n us engineer was employed by the company t o k eep track o f conditions and advise management on the setting of bonus rates and production standards. These were set once per month. As well, while the bonus system was started in 1923, the sample used in this study were collected from the period 1926 28. This period was chosen to minimize the e ects of rm learning about worker productivity and appropriate piece rates.
A n umber of di erent occupations were involved in the mining operations at Britannia. Those most directly involved in underground ore removal were miners and muckers. Miners drilled and blasted rock, and muckers shoveled away what the miners had blasted. Other occupations of timberman and timberman's helper reinforced the tunnels with timber supports; however variations in the hardness of rock and mining methods led to periods in which n o t i m bermen were employed. While these occupations received di erent base wages, company reports suggest that all workers in a given work place received the same bonus regardless of occupation. 6 Finally, p a yroll records show that base wages were not di-rectly linked to tenure. Similarly there is no mention in rm reports of production standards or bonus rates being linked to tenure either.
MODELLING THE BONUS SYSTEM
The model developed in this section is based on asymmetric information and team production. Output per team is assumed to be a function of each team member's e ort i and a productivity shock . The productivity shock captures variation in the quality o f r o c k at the rock face. Teams are assumed to comprise one miner and one mucker. I ignore timbermen and timberman helpers since their absence from certain periods in the data suggest that they were not regular team members. Team members can observe the value of before they choose their e ort level, however, the rm can only observe nal team output. The miner is assumed to act as team leader, in that he chooses his e ort level before the mucker does. This captures the temporal aspect of production in the mine where the miner drills and blasts rock and then the mucker shovels this rock a w a y .
It is clear that the mucker cannot shovel away more rock than the miner has blasted, similarly, the miner will not receive credit for any r o c k that the mucker leaves on the ground. I therefore approximate technology with a Leontief production function. That is, the output of a team working in sector j of the mine is
where d j and b j represent sector speci c xed e ects to productivity. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] Timing within a pay period: 0. The rm chooses the parameters of the bonus system.
1. Nature chooses , where ln N0; s 2 .
2. The miner observes and chooses a . 3. The mucker observes and a and chooses b . 4. The rm observes Y j and pays wages.
Wages for individual i in occupation n and team j are a function of team output according to the piece-wise linear scheme
where n is the base wage for occupation n, and w i is individual i's bonus. The bonus is determined by
where, x j denotes the production standard set by the rm, j is the bonus rate and n is the base wage for occupation n. The parameters of the wage system, j ; x j and n are chosen by the rm to maximize expected pro ts. Note that j and x j are common among team members. This is consistent with practice in the mine. They are, however, subscripted by j to re ect the fact that they can potentially vary across regions of the mine. Firm reports suggest that they were varied in response to changing conditions in the mine. It is also evident from rm reports that if workers did not think these rates were set fairly in certain areas of the mine, they would resist working in those areas. Following Ferrall and Shearer 1994, I assume that the rm sets j and x j to render miners ex-ante indi erent as to the area of the mine in which they work in any period. 7 This can be accomplished by setting j = dj and x j = d j x + b j . That is, j and x j cancel out xed di erences across areas of the mine. This allows consideration of the workers actions in response to the parameters and x regardless of the area of the mine in which they worked. I therefore concentrate on the normalized output function, wage and bonus equations y = minf a ; b g 1
It is possible to solve the rm's problem of choosing , and x to maximize pro ts using numerical methods. However, this is not required to identify productivity and will not be pursued here. In the empirical work that follows, , and x are allowed to change from period to period in response to changing market and mine conditions. 8 The contract the mine paid its workers is not the optimal contract that solves the classic principal agent model. Such a contract would depend on all observable characteristics which are related to productivity such a s t e n ure and occupation. One possible explanation for the simplicity of the observed scheme is that more complicated contracts have prohibitively high transaction costs associated with them. Ferrall and Shearer 1994 investigate empirically the role of transaction costs in determining the rm's choice of the bonus system at Britannia.
Utility of individual i is de ned as,
where kXi 2 2 i is the cost of e ort for an individual with personal characteristics X i . This form of utility function is common in incentive models. 9 Its main bene t is the absence of an income e ect on e ort, which implies that the base wage does not a ect the worker's optimal choice of e ort. While base wages contain information on productivity that is not sensitive to incentives, they can be ignored when estimating the worker's response to the bonus system. Estimation can concentrate solely on the distribution of bonuses, w i .
For the purposes of this paper, X i includes the variables tenure, age, and occupation. The cost of e ort function captures the relationship between tenure and productivity in the model. If the partial derivative o f k X i with respect to tenure is negative, then the cost of e ort decreases in tenure, so productivity and wages increase with tenure. If workers become more productive as they acquire human capital or experience, then it is reasonable to assume that it is less costly to provide a given level of e ort. Alternatively, if little or no learning occurs, it may b e that workers become less productive a s t e n ure increases due to fatigue. Estimating the nature of this e ect from the distribution of wages will be the focus of the empirical analysis in Section 5. 10 The E ort Decision.
Because is observed before e ort is chosen, the e ort decision comprises two c hoices. Working independently, each w orker would either choose a positive level of e ort which equates his marginal bene t of e ort to his marginal cost
or set e ort equal to zero and shirk. That is, because workers only receive a b o n us when productivity exceeds the production standard x, and because workers observe before choosing e ort, there are certain values of for which the e ort cost of earning a bonus is too high. The value of that equates the indirect utilities of each option is
This is the value of for which a w orker is just indi erent b e t w een working and shirking.
Team production places further constraints on the e ort decision. Namely, since the production function is Leontief, any amount of e ort which exceeds a teammate's e ort level is wasted.
The model is solved using backward induction. First, the mucker's best response function b a ; is derived. The miner then chooses his e ort level to maximize his utility taking the mucker's best response function as given. In equilibrium, each w orker only supplies e ort if his teammate supplies e ort. Furthermore, when both team members supply e ort, each will supply no more e ort than the other. The value of in the team setting is the maximum of the i 's that render each team member indifferent b e t w een e ort and shirking when they act independently. Since both members of the team receive the same bonus, equilibrium e ort is determined by their relative costs of e ort.
11 The equilibrium in a simultaneous m o v e game is similar to that derived here in that e ort levels will always be equal. However, in a simultaneous m o v e game, multiple equilibria are possible. In particular, any positive e ort level less than maxfka;kbg can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous m o v e game. These equilibria are ruled out in the sequential move game since the miner realizes that by increasing his e ort level to maxfka;kbg the mucker will follow him.
Expected Bonuses and Productivity
Substituting equilibrium e ort into the equation for bonuses, 3, gives the following equilibrium bonus distribution. That is, bonuses are censored away from zero. Even though the rm is willing to pay b o n uses for all levels of output greater than x, w orkers only provide e ort if their output will be above 2x and the resulting bonus above x. This censoring is due to workers observing before choosing their e ort level and the fact that they only receive a b o n us if output exceeds the production standard. Only for 's leading to bonuses greater than x will worker utility dominate that of shirking. This restriction will play an important role in estimating the model. Expected bonuses can be derived using the properties of the log normal distribution. 12 Recall that workers earn a base wage as well as the bonus. While the base wage does not a ect worker behaviour within the bonus system, 12 See Maddala 1983. it does contain information on worker productivity. T o incorporate this information into the analysis, I assume that the rm earns zero expected pro ts in the labour market. That is, normalizing the price of output to one, expected pro ts per team can be written 
THE BONUS DISTRIBUTION AND ESTIMATION
The data are uninformative as to the composition of teams. Estimating the model therefore requires an assumption on the e ort determination within teams. In particular, the personal characteristics determining the e ort decision enter through the cost of e ort parameter k i . T h us, if teams are matched so that miners determine e ort within teams i.e. k a k b , then a mucker's bonus will be not be a function of his own tenure, but rather the tenure of the miner with whom he is matched. In the long run the most e cient composition of teams would be attained by matching workers such that k a = k b . H o w ever, this may be di cult to achieve i n a n y period. Instead, I assume that k a k b . That is miners are insured not only against regional di erences within the mine but also with whom they are matched to work. This assumption implies that only the wages of miners can be analysed in relation to their tenure. Also note that the resulting estimates will still be consistent although there will be an e ciency loss if the rm did successfully match teams so that k a = k b . The estimates will be inconsistent if instead muckers determined team e ort. Thus in Section 5, I check the robustness of the empirical results to changes in this assumption.
Given the bonus distribution 4, de ne
where X i i s a v ector of observations on individual characteristics. The subscript indicates periods and re ects the fact that the rm can change the parameters of the bonus system in each period. Positive b o n uses for miner i in period can then be written as Substituting the estimated parameters from maximization of 8 into 6 and using information in the data on worker base wages permits estimation of worker productivity.
DATA F OR THE BRITANNIA MINE
The data contain information on employees who worked in Britannia's Victoria mine during the period from the beginning of 1926 through the end of 1928. The workers in the sample are all blue-collar, nonunionized males. The payroll records of the Victoria mine provide information on wages received under the bonus system. Workers were paid twice per month. For each p a y period data is available on each w orker's occupation, base wage, number of shifts worked, and total bonus for the pay period. No information is available on the bonus rate or on output. Furthermore, there is no information on when ie. time of day, where ie. in which sector of the mine, or with whom ie. the composition of his team a worker was working.
Personnel records kept by the company provide data on individual characteristics such as date of birth and starting date at the mine. These records were kept by Britannia o cials at least since the year 1913.
Workers were matched between the payroll records and the personnel les on the basis of name and payroll number. Matching proved di cult since payroll numbers often changed as did the spelling of names. As well, certain gaps have been noted in the alphabetic sequence of personnel les which suggests some records may h a v e been lost. Approximately one quarter of the workers in the payroll records during the period 1926 1928 have been matched with the personnel les.
The matched sample consists of 4793 observations on 244 individuals in 4 occupations | miner, mucker, timberman, and timberman's helper. It is important to note that although the payroll data is restricted to the years 1926-28, the personnel les cover a much broader range of time.
Namely, there are workers in the sample who started work at Britannia before 1926. While workers were paid twice per month, the mine would alter the parameters of the pay system, at most, once per month. The data are therefore grouped into monthly periods with each p a y period wage being treated as an independent record. For the purposes of empirical analysis, wages are converted into real values by dividing by the monthly New York price per pound of copper. Furthermore, since bonuses were paid on a per-shift basis, bonus per shift is used in the empirical analysis.
Of immediate concern is whether the matched sample is representative of the population the mine's work force as a whole. Figures 1 and 2 compare the average positive b o n us per shift with the proportion of workers receiving a bonus in the matched sample and the population for each period. The average positive b o n us per shift is calculated by a v eraging bonus per shift over all workers who received a bonus in either of the two week periods within a month. The two series match u p v ery well. The same general patterns are apparent in both the matched sample and the population, and the two series are generally very close to each other. This suggests that no systematic bias was introduced by the matching process. Teams are assumed to consist of miners and muckers. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample of these occupations. The wage data in Table 1 is expressed in 1926 pennies. It is apparent that the bonus per shift was usually quite small. Base wages of miners were $4.25 per shift while those of muckers were $4.00. The average bonus per shift over the course of the sampling period was approximately $.20. Thus on average workers were supplementing their income by approximately 5 through bonuses.
T able 1 A shift at Britannia was 8 hours in length. The average shifts worked per two w eek period is consistently high. It is over 12 in all periods and over 13 in many. Many w orkers were receiving only one or two d a ys o per month. This is not surprising due to the fact that the miners were not unionized and they were working in an isolated community.
Worker tenure is measured in months. It is calculated as the total number of calendar months in which the worker has worked at Britannia. In particular, if a worker arrives at the mine on March 11, 1926 he is considered to have one months tenure in March of 1926. Age is measured in years, since the month and day of birth was often not available.
The work force at Britannia was quite experienced. The average age in the sample is 32.5 years while the median age is 30. Similarly, a v erage tenure in the sample is 30.6 months, and the median level of tenure is 17 months. Table 2 presents average and median values for age and tenure by occupation. Note the workers in the occupation requiring more skill, namely miners, are generally older and have longer tenure. These results are consistent with human capital theory since workers are expected to have longer durations in jobs requiring a high degree of human capital investment where turnover is more costly. Note that tenure here is the length of time the individual has been at the rm. No measure of tenure within occupation is possible with this data set.
T able 2
RESULTS
I rst estimate the model under the assumptions of normally distributed errors, constant v ariance and no unobserved heterogeneity. I then relax these assumptions to test the model's speci cation.
Speci cation
Econometric analysis focuses on the speci cation and estimation of X i . Recall X i = k a X i 2 ; where k a is the cost of e ort function of the miner and X i is a vector of miner characteristics. The speci cation of X i must capture both the personal characteristics of the miners and period speci c e ects on . The period-speci c e ects allow for variation in as the rm adjusted the bonus rate in response to changing conditions within the mine. Taking logs gives ,ln X i = 2ln ,lnk a X i : 9 To specify lnk a X i let ,lnk a X i = 0 + 1 t i + 2 t 2 i + 3 a i + 4 a 2 i + 5 a i t i ; 10 where t i and a i denote respectively the tenure and age of individual i. Equation 9 also makes it clear that will not be separately identi ed from the constant term in ,lnk a X i .
To a v oid problems of multicollinearity associated with including a dummy v ariable for each period, I approximate these dummies with an Almon polynomial. I started with a polynomial of degree seven and sequentially tested the restrictions of decreasing this degree. The results for this speci cation appear in Table 3A . Note that the coe cients on tenure and age*tenure are both signi cant at the ve percent level, with positive and negative signs respectively. The age, age squared and tenure squared coe cients are insigni cant. After dropping age and age squared from the equation, the p-value on tenure is e ectively zero, while those for age*tenure and tenure squared are .002 and .061 respectively. The results are presented in Table 3B .
T able 3
The sample of 1583 observations includes only miners working in the Victoria mine. Muckers are excluded since the assumption on e ort determination within teams implies that mucker bonuses are independent of their tenure. The other extreme case is where muckers determine e ort levels within teams, ie. k b k a . A comparison of results under both assumptions is useful in gaging the robustness of the results. The results from estimation performed on the sample of muckers are given in Table  4 . It is clear from Table 4 that the pro le will retain its upward slope in tenure, however the second order term in tenure no longer has a signi cant a ect and is dropped from the speci cation. While age and age squared are not individually signi cant they are jointly signi cant. Furthermore, while the exact nature of the estimates change, the overall form of the pro le appears to be robust to changes in the assumption over e ort determination within teams.
T able 4
Productivity Pro les. Estimates of this expression, evaluated at the sample means for age and tenure are given for each period in the rst column of Table 5 . These estimates suggest that a one month increase in tenure increased productivity per shift by approximately 5.8e-3 pounds of copper. The elasticity of per shift productivity with respect to tenure can also be calculated as @E Y @t t E Y . Estimates of this expression, evaluated at the sample means are listed in column 2 of Table 5 . They suggest that a one percent increase in tenure led to a corresponding percentage increase in per shift productivity in the neighbourhood of 6.6e-3 percent. Productivity proles can also be graphed for each period. One such pro le, for period 1, is shown in Figure 3 T able 5 Figure 3 The increasing concave productivity pro les estimated here are similar in shape to those derived from studies on worker wages. 14 In this respect the results are supportive of the human capital and learning-bydoing interpretation of wage pro les. Namely, that the increasing concave w age pro les re ect changes in worker productivity o v er the course of tenure in the rm.
A comparison of the point estimates of the e ect of tenure on productivity with other studies is less instructive due to the unique nature of the sample used here. In perhaps the most closely related study, W eiss 1992 uses data on workers who were paid piece rates to estimate a learning curve in three electronics manufacturing plants. He reports median increases in productivity in the rst two months of employment o f between 10 and 45 percent at the three plants. Productivity gains decreased rapidly, h o w ever, and were between 0 and 1 percent b y the fth month. The fact that the miner's pro le is increasing over a longer period of time probably re ects the nature of the job. In particular, the miner must become accomplished at mining under a variety of di erent conditions. The ability to recognize di erent kinds of rock and thus apply suitable techniques can only be gained through experience and training.
The E ect of Modelling Behaviour.
Before going on to discuss the speci cation of the model, it is of interest to consider the e ect of explicitly modelling the e ort decision of the worker. Consider a naive model of the bonus system in which behavior is not modelled. Let a latent v ariable This is simply a standard statistical wage equation adjusted for the censoring of the bonus distribution. Comparing this speci cation to 11, it is clear that the failure to model e ort implies an inability to separate the e ects of worker choices on bonuses from the e ects of rm choices, namely x . Intuitively, a regression between wages and tenure captures both rm and worker behavior. Modelling worker behavior, allows the separate identi cation of worker e ects.
Results from estimating 12 are presented in Table 6 . Note that the coe cient o n t e n ure is larger than that of Table 3 . The estimated marginal return to tenure derived from 12 is 1 + 2 2 t + 3 a .
These results are presented in the fth column of Table 5 . While they di er from the values in column 1, there is no consistent relationship between the two estimates. Di erences between these estimates may b e caused by t w o factors. First, the e ort decision is not modelled in 12 and therefore enters into the error term. If e ort is changing over the course of tenure, then this will cause a bias in the estimated tenure coe cient. The fact that the tenure coe cient is larger when the e ort decision is ignored suggests that unobserved e ort is biasing the estimate upwards. In other words, e ort is positively correlated with tenure. Second, it is clear from the model that the worker's e ort decision is a ected by and x . H o w ever, since 12 cannot identify these parameters, their e ect on the productivity pro le is ignored.
While the naive model does not nest 11, the regressors in the two models are identical and the dependent v ariables are non linear transformations of each other. This allows for a comparison of the models based on the value of their respective log likelihood functions taking account of the appropriate Jacobian terms. 15 Namely, the logarithmic transformation of the dependent v ariable in 11 creates a Jacobian term for the density of positive b o n uses: the term 1 w i; + x in 8. While this term is constant and will therefore not a ect parameter estimates and is not included in the reported value of the loglikelihood function in Table 3 , it does a ect the value of the loglikelihood. Summing the log of this term over all positive observations and adding the result to the value of the loglikelhood reported in Table 3 , gives the correct value of the loglikelihood function, -2106.16. Comparing this value to value of the loglikelihood function from the naive model, -2251.59, suggests that 11, the speci cation in which e ort is modelled, is preferred.
T able 6
15 See Davidson and Mackinnon 1993 p. 491.
TESTS OF MISSPECIFICATION
The results of the model presented in the previous section were estimated under the assumption of homoscedastic and normal errors. It is well known that if either of these assumptions are violated, then the resulting estimates from a censored regression model will be inconsistent.
Robust Estimation.
A general way in which to deal with possible inconsistency due to heteroscedasticity and non-normality is to use robust estimation methods. One such method is the symmetrically censored least squares SCLS technique developed by P o w ell 1986. Powell's estimator exploits the orthogonality condition that must hold when errors are symmetrically distributed about a mean of zero. In particular, given the censored regression model Results from implementing Powell's SCLS procedure on the model are presented in Table 7 . 16 The coe cients on tenure, tenure squared and age*tenure are all of the same sign as the corresponding maximum likelihood estimates in Table 3 however the magnitudes are smaller in absolute value. The variables are no longer individually signi cant. Furthermore, a joint test fails to reject the null hypothesis that these coe cients are all equal to zero at standard levels of statistical signi cance. 17 The lack of statistical signi cance in the estimates may be due to the amount o f information that is discarded during the censoring procedure.
T able 7
The fact that the SCLS tenure coe cient is smaller than the corresponding maximum likelihood estimate suggests that the assumption 16 Estimates were calculated using the trimmed least squares iteration algorithm given in Powell 1986 . The algorithm converged after 108 iterations. At the nal estimates, 785 observations are included in estimation.
17 The test statistic is n^ 1:3 V ^ ,1 1:3 ^ 1:3 , which is distributed as 2 3 under the null hypothesis. The value of the test statistic is 4.97 which has a p-value of 0.17. of constant v ariance may be unsatisfactory. There are two reasons why this assumption could be violated. First, conditions in the mine were changing from period to period as rock w as removed and new rock faces were exposed. It therefore seems reasonable to allow the variance of productivity shocks to change from period to period to re ect these changing conditions. Second, heterogeneous workers may h a v e been sorted through time. That is, a cohort of workers may receive a wide range of bonuses at the beginning of their tenure, re ecting their di erent abilities as miners. Through time, as the less able miners leave for other more suitable employment, the cohort becomes more homogeneous and the variance of the distribution of bonuses decreases.
To consider these e ects I rst estimate the model allowing for period speci c variances. The results are presented in Table 8 . Note that the value of the tenure coe cient is .023, similar to the tenure coe cient i n T able 3B, .020, derived from parametric estimation restricting s to be constant across periods. Yet, the estimates of sigma vary a great deal from period to period. To k eep gures to a minimum Table 8 presents only the average 1.334, maximum 2.493, and minimum 0.88 values of the sigmas. The value of the likelihood function increases signi cantly to -1949.28 . The likelihood ratio test statistic of the restrictions is equal to 60.17 with 36 degrees of freedom. The p-value is .007 which rejects the null hypothesis that s is constant at standard signi cant levels.
T able 8
Next, I consider the issue of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. It is straight forward to alter the model to take account of hetero- where p h is the probability that a miner is a high productivity t ype.
Maximizing 13 with respect to the parameters of X; s ; h ; l , and p h gives maximum likelihood estimates which take account of unobserved heterogeneity. These estimates are presented in Table 9 . The two constant terms correspond to the two v alues of and the probability parameter corresponds to p h . Notice that the estimated tenure coe cient .010 is similar to that arrived at using Powell's semi-parametric estimator .013. The estimated marginal e ect of tenure based on the estimates of Table 9 are presented in the third column of Table 5 . Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity reduces the estimate of the marginal e ect of productivity to approximately 2.0e-3 pounds of copper per shift. The productivity pro le based on these estimates is presented in Figure 4 . 18 While the shape of the pro le is similar to the pro le in Figure 3 , it is considerably atter.
Figure 4
Figure 5 provides a more direct comparison of the two pro les. Here, both pro les are scaled to facilitate comparison. The fact that the unobserved heterogeneity controlled productivity pro le is atter than the parametric pro le suggests that the parametric pro le over-estimates the e ect of tenure on productivity. This is consistent with the sorting argument. Namely, the steep slope of the productivity pro le in Figure 3 does not re ect the rate at which tenure increases the productivity o f a given worker, but rather that as tenure increases the average quality o f the workforce increases as poor workers are selected out of the mine. 6. CONCLUSION The direct observation of worker productivity i s v ery rare. In light of this, econometric studies often proxy productivity with wages. Wage regressions, with tenure as an independent v ariable, are then used to estimate worker productivity pro les. However, theoretical models have suggested that wages may c hange with tenure, independently of productivity. This causes problems in interpreting the results of these wage regressions. These problems of interpretation can be overcome by using wage data generated from a piece rate compensation scheme. Inherent i n such data is a natural link between wages and worker productivity which allows for the identi cation of productivity pro les from observed wages. This paper has estimated productivity pro les from piece rate data, controlling for the incentive e ects that the compensation system has on worker productivity. Data was collected and analyzed from the payroll records of the Britannia Mining Company. Results suggest that miner productivity w as an increasing, concave function of tenure. Tests of misspeci cation con rm the robustness of the shape of the productivity prole. The slope of the pro le was found to be upwardly biased by unobserved heterogeneity among the workers. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the data, a one month increase in tenure was estimated to increase productivity b y 2.0e-3 pounds of copper per shift for a miner with 40 months of experience. This is compared to an equivalent estimate of 5.8e-3 pounds per shift when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.
The increasing concave shape of the pro le is consistent with studies which use wages as a proxy for productivity. This provides evidence in support of the human capital learning-by-doing interpretation of these wage regressions. Namely, that the changes in wages re ect changes in worker productivity. 
